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1. Solidarities in Times of Uncertainty  
Most European labour lawyers are currently engaged in a sharp 
war of words regarding  fundamental social rights and their respective 
roles and functions in the coming new phase of European integration. 
Two main directions can be identified in the attempt to clarify the content 
of this debate and in order to look to the future as to new developments.  
The first has to do with the impact of the controversial rulings of 
the Court of Justice dealing with collective social rights. The enforcement 
of these judgments falls into the dangerous trap of proportionality 
principles and opens up difficult scenarios for judges and social partners 
alike at the national level when faced with overriding market freedoms.
1 
Some member states are already active in establishing new rules for the 
game in compliance with the Court’s judgments, while still preserving the 
autonomy of collective bargaining.
2  
The second direction is imposed by the economic and financial 
crisis. The word ‘solidarity’ appears in recent European sources, referring 
either to urgent measures that need to be adopted,
3 or as a derogation of 
previous sources to provide immediate help to workers who have lost 
their jobs as a ‘direct result of the global financial and economic crisis’.
4  
These two directions run parallel to each other, as collective social 
rights are, in the best consolidated European tradition, pivotal to the 
achievement of solidarity and social justice.  
The Commission has recently been thinking along these lines when 
aiming at consolidating and improving all sources potentially suitable in 
anticipating and managing changes. We see this approach in the 
Commission’s Social Agenda,
5 as well as in a document specifically 
                                                 
* This paper will appear in the Liber Amicorum for Ronnie Eklund (K. Ahlberg (ed), Vänbok   
> till Ronnie Eklund, Iustus, Uppsala 2010). I wish to thank Dr. Francesca Bassetti, fellow of 
the CESIFIN Foundation in Florence, for valuable and accurate help in the completion of 
footnotes. Any omissions and mistakes are exclusively mine. 
1 The literature on Viking,  Laval,  Rüffert and Luxembourg cases is vast. A stimulating 
summary, in the light of recent developments in the UK, is offered by C. Kilpatrick, British 
Jobs for British Workers? UK Industrial Action and Free Movement of Services in EU Law, 
LSE Working Paper 16/2009 and by the same author The ECJ and Labour Law: a 2008 
Retrospective, ILJ 2009, 180. 
2 Further on see section 3. 
3 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Council, A European Economic Recovery Plan, 26 November 2008, COM (2008) 
800 final. 
4 Regulation (EC) n. 546/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 
2009, amending Regulation n. 1927/2006 on establishing the European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund, art. 1.1. 
5 Communication of the Commission ‘Renewed Social Agenda: Opportunities, access and 
solidarity in 21st Century Europe’, Brussels, 2 July 2008, COM (2008) 412. TRANSNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN WAYS FORWARD FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
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related to transnational company agreements.
6 Furthermore, 
amendments have been introduced to the revised Directive on European 
Works Councils (EWC)
7 in order to emphasize the transnational 
competence of such bodies at the relevant level of company or group of 
companies, according to the issue under discussion.  
In all such cases, solidarity among workers acquires new 
dimensions, mainly linked to uncertain circumstances. It is uncertain 
what will happen to workers posted to a host country to provide services 
and, in a more challenging manner, how workers in the receiving country 
will react when facing potential social dumping. The same can be 
maintained for workers whose fundamental social rights come into 
collision with an equally fundamental market freedom, such as freedom 
of establishment. 
The result of the economic and financial crisis is uncertain as to its 
terms in losses of jobs and/or relocation of jobs to other countries, both 
within and outside the EU. The revised European Globalization 
Adjustment Fund (EGAF), one of the most innovative responses provided 
in recent years, suggests taking into account ‘a reasoned analysis of the 
link between the redundancies and major structural changes in world 
trade patterns or the financial and economic crisis, a demonstration of 
the number of redundancies, and an explanation of the unforeseen nature 
of those redundancies’.
8 
It is equally uncertain how company restructuring – a 
phenomenon carefully monitored by European institutions over the years 
– will evolve in present times and whether existing tools to counteract 
managerial strategies will prove efficient. Empirical data is required
9 in 
                                                 
6 Commission Staff Working Document, The role of transnational company agreements in 
the context of increasing international integration, Brussels, 2 July 2008, SEC (2008) 2155. 
7 Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the 
establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale 
undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing 
and consulting employees, OJ L 122/28, 16 May 2009. 
8 Regulation (EC) 546/2009 at fn. 4, art. 1.4, replacing art. 5(2)(a). 
9 See, for example, the large interdisciplinary project coordinated by M.A. Moreau Agire, 
Anticiper pour une gestion innovante des restructurations en Europe, www.fse-agire.com. 
and the special issue, Restructurations en Europe, Semaine Social Lamy, Supplément n. 
1376, 24 November 2008. See also M.A: Moreau, S. Negrelli, P. Pochet, Building 
anticipation of restructuring in Europe, PIE Peter Lang 2009. The Commission started to be 
active as to these issues in the late 1990s, following the Report of a High Level Group 
chaired by Pehr Gyllenhammar. Monitoring of major restructuring operations has been 
carried on by Eurofound, see in particular European Monitoring Centre on Change (EMCC) 
and European Restructuring Monitor (ERM), www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc. Setting 
criteria to measure job losses due to restructuring is not an easy task, see within the 
framework of the Eurofound project, D. Storrie, Restructuring and employment in the EU: 
concepts measurement and evidence, Luxembourg, OOPEC 2006. 4 SILVANA SCIARRA 
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order to detect the complex reality behind managerial strategies 
whenever they interact with transnational collective interests, both on the 
side of employers and of workers. This learning process is underway, 
requiring a deeper understanding of current practices in conjunction with 
a rigorous interpretation of the law. However, it would be wrong to argue 
that uncertainty comes as the most direct effect of the free provision of 
services, freedom of establishment and transnational restructuring. The 
rise of finance – in the broad sense currently attributed to this word – has 
revealed serious weaknesses in collective bargaining systems. The latter 
are framed within political and economic systems and, despite their claim 
for autonomy, at times can be hit by unforeseen circumstances.
10  
Company restructuring is very often the result of global 
manoeuvres, leading to mergers and acquisitions. Frequent changes in 
production systems affect work organisation and skill requirements in a 
significantly rapid way. Collective bargaining cannot intervene with 
traditional tools in this fluid process. Information regarding changes – 
both financial and organizational – thus becomes integral to bargaining 
collectively and to anticipating issues of relevance for both sides within 
the negotiations. 
One of the purposes of this paper is to investigate whether 
uncertainties caused by economic and financial downturns are aggravated 
by the fact that a vague notion of solidarity is taking shape. Such an 
indistinct steering principle could slowly weaken traditions deeply rooted 
in labour law. Collective actors could, as a result, find themselves lacking 
the necessary legitimacy to face global challenges. 
One way to address issues of uncertainty linked to the above 
described phenomena of job shortages and social dumping is to rethink 
the notion of solidarity as a driving force behind collective bargaining. 
Solidarity, framed within the potentially expanding transnational scope of 
collective agreements, needs to adapt to the volatility of managerial 
strategies and constantly changing demands for new skills and 
professional qualifications.
11  
                                                 
10 S. M. Jacoby, Finance and Labor: Perspectives on risk, inequality, and democracy, CLLPJ 
2008, 17 ff; S. Deakin, The rise of finance: what is it, what is driving it, what might stop it?, 
CLLPJ 2008, 67 ff., commenting on Jacoby’s paper. See also, for a future prognosis, Lord 
Wedderburn, Labour Law 2008: 40 years on, in ILJ 2007, 397 ff.  
11 Cedefop - European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
Future skill needs in Europe. Medium-term Forecast, Luxembourg, OOPEC 2008. A recent 
survey covering 27 Member States and Norway stresses the centrality of collective 
bargaining: Cedefop, Contribution of collective bargaining to continuing vocational training, 
Dublin 2009. The Commission Communication, Recovery, at fn. 3, p. 11 discusses how to 
‘improve the monitoring and matching of skills development and upgrading with anticipated 
and existing job vacancies’. Recent findings in Investing in SEOR Erasmus University TRANSNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN WAYS FORWARD FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
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Thus, solidarities – in the plural – become starting points for 
differentiation, rather than for overall and encompassing processes of 
standard setting. Solidarities should emerge as a result of new 
legitimacies; they should mirror processes of changes within companies 
and adapt to them, constantly opening new levels of negotiations.  
One starting point is to look at company restructuring and 
evaluate the legal nature of company agreements dealing with matters 
related to structural changes, affecting both the quality and quantity of 
jobs. We shall then examine other negotiated texts at the international 
and European level, in an attempt to draw a picture of existing voluntary 
sources, all characterised by issues of ‘transnationality’. 
2. Restructuring, Company Agreements and Global 
Challenges 
The approach to restructuring within the framework of the Commission’s 
Renewed Social Agenda
12 is to favour, more explicitly than before, a 
coordination of existing policies and a profitable exchange of data on 
mass dismissals.
13 On one hand, there is a need to enhance employment 
policies as defined in the ‘new’ strategy pursued by Barroso, ensuring 
that National Reform Programs (NRP) include effective measures on 
flexicurity. The latter are expected to tackle both internal and external 
flexibility, while guaranteeing more proactive measures through efficient 
labour market institutions.
14  
On the other hand, regional and sector analyses should be 
pursued, in order to favour policies tailored for local labour markets and 
for specific economic activities. The example of Canada is pertinent, 
whereby ‘sector employment and qualifications councils’ are set up for 
the coordination of training needs related to potential job shortages. This 
idea of anticipation relies on the active participation of social partners, in 
                                                                                                                              
Rotterdam, TNO Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research, ZSI Centre for 
Social Innovation, Study conducted on behalf of the European Commission, Employment, 
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities DG, The Future of Jobs and Skills - Scenarios, 
implications and options in anticipation of future skills and knowledge needs, 2009. 
12 See fn. 5  
13 Commission Staff Working Paper, Restructuring and employment the contribution of the 
European Union, Brussels, 2 July 2008, SEC (2008) 2154. 
14 For a discussion as to the changes occurring in employment policies under the Barroso 
presidency of the Commission, see S. Sciarra, Is Flexicurity a European Policy?, in R. 
Eklund, R. Hager, J. Kleineman, H.-Å. Wängberg (eds.), Skrifter till Anders Victorins minne, 
Iustus Förlag, Uppsala, 2009, 447 ff., also appearing in URGE Working Paper n. 4/2008, 
www.urge.it/files/papers/2_wpurge4_2008.pdf. See also J. Kenner, New frontiers in EU 
labour law: from flexicurity to flex-security, in M. Dougan, S. Currie (eds.), 50 years of the 
European treaties, Oxford, Hart Publishing 2009, 279 ff. 6 SILVANA SCIARRA 
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accordance with local authorities and in particular with institutions 
devoted to training.
15  
As seen, solidarity is underpinned by different values. In flexicurity 
policies, the combination of law and collective agreements is 
indispensable to meeting the needs of both companies and workers. This 
is part of the employment policies at the national level. Thus, solidarity 
can be linked to more general and abstract principles, as in legislation 
auxiliary to collective bargaining. This ‘model’ legislation is still part of the 
European tradition, particularly in the Scandinavian countries, and should 
be set as an example of mutual adaptability among regulatory sources.
16 
It is asserted that the state, whenever possible, should not 
interfere with managerial strategic choices in company restructuring, 
leaving ample space for negotiations between the social partners. 
However, national governments have been asked to intervene when large 
productive sectors have recently been hit by the crisis. Seeking solutions 
compatible with European law
17 should be part of the forward-looking 
initiatives of the social partners. Auxiliary measures, such as socially 
responsible investments, support for new consumer demands and for the 
creation of European infrastructures, should not be perceived as obstacles 
to autonomous collective bargaining. 
Solidarity can be built around more circumscribed goals, for 
example, having to do with the obligation to retrain a certain number of 
redundant workers with the view of keeping them employed. The 
alternative option, to relocate them within the same company or outside 
it, could still be the outcome of a joint decision between management and 
labour. The latter is another example of solidarity, originated by a 
concession agreement, having as its main goal the continuation of 
employment, albeit with uncertain outcomes as to where and when.  
In these latter cases, restructuring depicts a notion of selective 
solidarity. It is based on a distribution of sacrifices and losses among 
workers, sometimes in view of creating chances and opportunities. 
Selectivity refers particularly to the choice of keeping some workers 
employed, whereas others, for objective reasons, are left outside of 
                                                 
15 Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2008) 2154, at fn. 13, p. 10.  
16 S. Sciarra, The evolution of labour law (1992 – 2003), General Report, vol. I, Luxemburg, 
OOPEC 2005, 38 ff. on the concept of semi-mandatory law. More specifically see N. Bruun, 
J. Malmberg,  National Report on Denmark, Finland and Sweden (1992 – 2003) in The 
Evolution of labour law, National reports of 15 countries, Vol. 2, Luxembourg, OOPEC 2005. 
17 See, for example, the proposal addressed to the automobile industry for a ‘European 
green cars initiative’, to be funded by the Community, the EIB, industry and Member States, 
in Commission Communication, Recovery, at fn. 3, p. 16. Further details in COM (2009) 104 
final, Responding to the crisis in the European automotive sector, 25 February 2009, and in 
www.anticipationofchange.eu/index.php?id=346. TRANSNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN WAYS FORWARD FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
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employment, in search of alternative solutions that may or may not be 
the outcome of the company’s restructuring strategies. The EGAF has 
previously been mentioned as the most recent support provided by 
European law, albeit to restricted numbers of workers.  
Furthermore, local tripartite pacts – often described as social pacts 
– can originate from solidarity within given local communities, 
characterised by shared economic activities, such as in clusters of 
companies or industrial districts. They can call upon the active 
involvement of public local authorities, co-opted to various degrees within 
a scheme of mutual promises and obligations.
18 When national 
governments are asked to intervene, solidarity becomes the product of a 
political decision and is once more selective, attached as it is to options 
among different available priorities.  
In all such cases, an ‘objective’ notion of solidarity should be 
elaborated, since redistributive effects should always be attached to 
transparent and non-discriminatory selective criteria. We ought to be 
guided by the best traditions in European labour law, whereby business 
necessities are measured against the guarantee of individual and 
collective fundamental rights. 
Yet, we can see that the spreading of the current crisis reveals 
growing inequalities, also due to the failure of collective bargaining in 
controlling global financial strategies. The search for selective and yet 
objective criteria of solidarity thus becomes a dramatic task that should 
be based on political accountability and, when it comes to the roles 
played by private governments, on a strengthened legitimacy of the 
bargaining agents.  
It can be argued that processes legitimizing negotiators should be 
equally selective and provide for specific mandates, reflecting the specific 
contents under discussion. This debate is still undefined at the European 
level, fluctuating among the enforcement of existing secondary 
legislation, above all the revised EWC Directive, and the introduction of 
new measures to support transnational collective agreements.
19 
                                                 
18 This practice is not unfamiliar in comparative labour law. See S. Sciarra, The evolution of 
collective bargaining: observations on a comparison in the countries of the European Union, 
CLLPJ 2007, 8; B. Caruso, Changes in the workplace and the dialogue of labor scholars in 
the ‘global village’, CLLPJ 2007, 530 ff. 
19 See the proposals by the groups of experts appointed by the Commission, E. Ales, S. 
Engblom, T. Jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, J. F. Valdes, Transnational 
collective bargaining: past, present and future. Final Report, 2006, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2897&langId=en. Comments on the ‘Ales 
Report’ in A. Lo Faro, La contrattazione collettiva transnazionale: prove di ripresa del 
dialogo sociale in Europa?’ Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali 2007, 551 ff. 8 SILVANA SCIARRA 
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A complex spectrum of observation is offered by company 
agreements on restructuring. Here the catchy phrase ‘anticipation and 
management of changes’ is frequently linked to the exercise of collective 
rights to information and consultation, thus falling under the scope of the 
EWC Directive. The interesting point to underscore is that whenever such 
rights are effectively exercised, there is a tendency to open up bargaining 
opportunities and even to reach agreements beyond the letter of the 
law.
20  
Nonetheless, there are dark sides to the enforcement of the EWC 
Directive. In 1997, when the closure of the Renault plant at Vilvoorde in 
Belgium occurred, failure to respect management’s obligations prompted 
the European Commission to propose a new Directive on information and 
consultation of employees.
21 It is noteworthy that this latter source 
should now be subject to coordination with other parallel sources within 
the framework of the revised EWC Directive. Failures to enforce rights to 
information and consultation have, in fact, continued to be at the origins 
of highly controversial cases, such as the recent announcement to move 
Nokia’s businesses from Germany to Romania.
22  
Company restructuring follows, as one can see, unpredictable 
paths. It cannot be stopped, nor limited, when the mobility of capital and 
company assets are at stake and economic efficiency must be pursued. 
This is why observers of such complex phenomena should be looking at 
all available options whenever transnational economic initiatives 
challenge traditional collective bargaining.  
                                                 
20 This ongoing practice is underlined in the Ales Report, infra fn. 19, section 3.2. See also 
M. Carley, M.Hall, European Works Councils and Transnational Restructuring, European 
Foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions, Luxembourg, OOPEC 
2006; A. Alaimo, Il coinvolgimento dei lavoratori nell’impresa: informazione, consultazione e 
partecipazione, in S. Sciarra e B. Caruso (eds), Il lavoro subordinato, Trattato di diritto 
privato di diritto europeo, Torino Giappichelli, 2009, 659 ff. 
21 Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 
establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European 
Community - Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
on employee representation, in OJ L 80/29, 23 March 2002. For an analysis of the critical 
enforcement of the Directive in the UK, see P. Taylor, C. Baldry, A. Danford, P. Stewart, 
Corporate restructuring, redundancy and the effectiveness of ICE Regulations, Relations 
Industrielles/Industrial Relations 2009, 27 ff. 
22 Nokia closes its Bochum plant, in European restructuring monitor quarterly 2008, n. 1, 11 
www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2008/37/en/1/ef0837en.pdf. Interesting developments, 
relevant for arguments used in this paper, are in the application filed to the EGAF for some 
1300 German workers made redundant at Nokia. This was announced in Brussels, 31 July 
2009. 
See the press release in 
www.lex.unict.it:80/eurolabor/documentazione/comunicati_stampa.htm.     TRANSNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN WAYS FORWARD FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
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2.1 Joint Transnational Texts 
The Commission has listed 147 ‘joint transnational texts’ in 89 companies 
since 2000.
23 The breadth of this phenomenon calls into question the 
compatibility of national – both legal and voluntary – sources, whenever 
the transnational scope of these new operations needs to be addressed. 
A clarification is needed in legal terms, following the Commission’s 
own words: ‘Texts intended to apply in more than one Member State and 
which have been concluded by companies and workers’ representatives 
are referred to by the generic term transnational texts’.
24 No confusion 
should be made with collective bargaining in national legal systems, its 
levels and functions. Furthermore, showing a meticulous linguistic 
approach, the Commission clarifies that negotiations – ‘an interactive 
process leading ultimately to a compromise’ – are nothing but a ‘generic 
term’, again not to be confused with collective bargaining.
25  
The Commission’s suggestion tests the social partners’ intention to 
structure transnational texts around certain formal requirements. The 
need to preserve autonomous collective bargaining at the national level 
cannot ignore the de facto uprising of new formulas. Companies eager to 
attach concrete legal results to restructuring are plausibly those 
interested in promoting settlements and in doing so by involving worker 
representatives.  
Transnational collective interests, following the Commission’s 
hesitant words, are generated by the simple practical implication that 
‘texts’ are valid in more than one Member State. Transnational 
managerial decisions open opportunities for ‘compromises’, binding on 
the negotiators, albeit not in the same way as collective agreements are 
in national legal systems.  
2.2 Codes of Conduct and International Framework Agreements 
Let us now look outside the EU. For quite a long time, codes of conduct 
have been adopted by international organizations and large transnational 
companies as leading sources to enforce fundamental rights, hence 
recognizing the counterparty’s significant role, despite the fact that their 
unilateral adoption did not imply negotiations, nor the signature of 
agreements.
26 Codes of conduct are part of a ‘soft’ approach to labour 
                                                 
23 Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2155, at fn. 6, 3. 
24 Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2155, at fn. 6, 5. 
25 Ibidem. 
26 H. Arthurs, Private ordering and workers' rights in the global economy: corporate codes of 
conduct as a regime of labour market regulation in J. Conaghan, K. Klare, M. Fischl (eds.), 
Transformative labour law in the era of globalization, Oxford, OUP 2001, 471 ff.; B. Hepple, 
Labour laws and global trade, Oxford, Hart Publishing 2005, 69 ff.; M.A. Moreau, Normes 10 SILVANA SCIARRA 
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rights, mainly because they are not, in a strict sense, legally binding. 
They provide the right jargon for governance of transnational companies, 
often in conjunction with the adoption of good practices, dealing with 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).  
Recent research shows that these practices have been 
progressively turned into proper negotiations, leading to the signature of 
International Framework Agreements (IFA).
27 In this new framework of 
collective and mutual obligations, ‘global responsibility’ constitutes the 
correct way ahead and should be consistently pursued through 
organizational learning, a more dynamic and interactive process than 
CSR.
28 Rather than becoming an alternative, or even a way to escape 
labour law and collective bargaining, CSR and corporate codes of conduct 
should supplement legal and voluntary sources and be better equipped in 
providing effective monitoring, seeking, when necessary, institutional 
support.
29 
The ongoing transformation of codes of conduct into negotiated 
texts raises several questions relevant to the discussion in this paper. The 
search for more structured and binding sources is instructive insofar as it 
challenges both parties in proving their legitimacy. The setting of 
standards within bilateral negotiations presupposes that all levels of 
decision-making within the company are made responsible and that all 
workers are included within the scope of the agreement. The potential 
impact of this new regulatory framework is extraordinary when it affects 
subcontractors and companies over which control is exercised, thus 
expanding the coverage towards a vast number of workers.
30  
                                                                                                                              
sociales, Droit du travail et Mondialisation, Dalloz 2006 ; A. Sobczak, Réseaux de sociétés et 
codes de conduite : un nouveau modèle de régulation des relations de travail pour les 
entreprises européennes, Paris, L.G.D.J. 2002. 
27 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Codes of 
conduct and international framework agreements: New forms of governance at company 
level, Luxembourg, OOPEC 2008; K. Papadakis (ed.), Cross-border social dialogue and 
agreements: an emerging global industrial relations framework, ILO-IILS Geneva 2008 and 
in particular the chapter by A. Sobczak, Legal dimensions of international framework 
agreements in the field of corporate social responsibility, 115 ff. The ILO research looks at 
62 IFAs, enforced in 2007 and points out that the number would grow considerably if 
agreements informally signed by CAEs in European groups of companies should be included 
in the field research. 
28 A. B. Antal, A. Sobczak, Beyond CSR: organisational learning for global responsibility, 
Journal of general management 2004, 77 ff. The authors refer, among other examples, to 
‘global compact’, an experiment launched in 2004 by Kofi Annan at the UN (89 ff.). See 
www.unglobalcompact.org.  
29 L. Compa, Corporate social responsibility and workers’ rights, CLLPJ 2008, 1 ff. 
30 A. Sobczak, Codes of conduct in subcontracting networks. A labour law perspective, 
Journal of Business Ethics 2003, 225 ff. TRANSNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN WAYS FORWARD FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
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In this new scheme of action, solidarity interlinks the national and 
transnational levels. While broad issues, such as respect for fundamental 
social rights, continue to be dealt with, health and safety is at stake in a 
large percentage of IFAs (85%), as are wages (70%), referring back to 
national law and collective agreements for specific applicable standards.
31 
The novelty is the creation of new collective actors: the International 
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Global Union Federations (GUF), 
active at the sector level, and the International Organization of 
Employers, active in providing training for managers. The examples 
explored so far prove that the most innovative experimentations are 
those tested by the social partners, whenever a transnational dimension 
of collective interests is at stake.  
ILO research shows that Framework Agreements are considered 
international even when GUFs have a single employer, not an association, 
as a counterparty. Relevance is assigned to the international scope of the 
agreement, namely the building up of cross-border solidarity.  
An equally significant outcome is the agreement reached by the 
European Community Ship Owners’ Associations (ECSA) and the 
European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF), following the Court of 
Justice’s ruling in Viking.
32 Here the transnational weight of the 
agreement is no doubt related to the mobility of ship owners in exercising 
freedom of establishment within the EU. The origins of the agreement, 
becoming a proposal for a Council Directive, in force of art. 139.2 of the 
TEC,
33 lie in the potentially explosive contradiction among different 
aspects of collective interests, should the ship owner be left free to fly 
                                                 
31 A. Sobczak, Legal dimensions at fn. 27. 
32 Judgment of the Court of 11 December 2007, International Transport Workers' Federation 
(ITWF) and Finnish Seamen's Union (FSU) v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, C-
438/05. 
33 Communication from the Commission under Art 138(2) of the EC Treaty on the 
strengthening of maritime labour standards, COM(2006) 287 final, 15 June 2006. The 
Commission consulted the social partners in order to reach a framework agreement for the 
transposition into European law of some principles enshrined in the ILO Convention. See EU 
social partners: agreement reached on implementing ILO maritime labour convention, 
European Employment Review, 13 December 2007 (no. 407). Proposal for a Council 
Directive implementing the agreement concluded by the European Community Shipowners’ 
Associations (ECSA) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) on the Maritime 
Labour Convention 2006 and amending Directive 1999/63/EC, 2 July 2008, COM (2008) 422 
final. Positive comments on these original developments in N. Lillie, The ILO Maritime 
Labour Convention 2006: a New Paradigm for Global Labour Rights Implementation, in K. 
Papadakis (ed.), Cross-Border Social Dialogue and Agreements: an Emerging Global 
Industrial Relations Framework, Geneva, ILO 2008, 191 ff.; S. Sciarra, Viking and Laval: 
Collective labour rights and market freedoms in the enlarged EU, in C. Barnard (ed.), The 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2007-2008, vol. 10, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2008, 563 ff. 12 SILVANA SCIARRA 
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flags of convenience. This European sector agreement, originally inspired 
by the relevant 2006 ILO Convention,
34 still in the process of ratification, 
shows an interesting contamination among legal sources, all intended to 
set transnational standards. The result is the coverage of large number of 
workers, through legally binding sources of regulation, for the guarantee 
of labour standards within an entire economic sector.  
The same result cannot be taken for granted in IFAs and company 
agreements on restructuring. However, interpretative criteria are 
emerging from the practice of transnational agreements and should be 
further explored by the social partners, in view of building up their 
transnational legitimacy.  
2.3 The Revised EWC Directive  
The lack of effectiveness as to the right of informing and consulting EWCs 
in cases of restructuring is mentioned by the Commission in its Proposal 
for amending the 94/45 Directive. In fact, an incomplete success story 
lies in the origins of the proposal. During fifteen years, 820 EWCs were 
set up for the purpose of being informed and consulted, representing 
14.5 million employees. They cover only 36 % of the undertakings falling 
under the coverage of the Directive.
 Furthermore, interpretative problems 
have arisen in cases of mergers and acquisitions and whenever rights to 
information and consultation had to be exercised at the national and 
transnational levels.
35 The proposal is part of the renewed Lisbon agenda; 
it interacts with the ongoing discussion on restructuring and transnational 
company level agreements; it ensures respect of art. 27 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
Drafters of the 94/45 Directive were aware that concentrations of 
companies, through cross-border mergers and take-overs, are 
phenomena originated in the functioning of the internal market. The 
revised Directive has the objective of improving the effectiveness of 
information and consultation rights, setting criteria that are mainly 
procedural. One way is by the opportunity offered to the EWC to give an 
opinion to the undertaking in a ‘timely fashion’, an expression echoing a 
similar provision in the Collective Redundancies Directive 98/59.
36 The 
                                                 
34 ILO, Maritime Labour Convention, MLC (C186), adopted on 23 February 2006, available at 
www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm.  
35 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive, COM (2008) 419 final, 
2008/0141, (COD), presented by the Commission, p. 2, sections 3 and 4. 
36 ‘Where an employer is contemplating collective redundancies, he shall begin consultations 
with the workers' representatives in good time with a view to reaching an agreement’, 
Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies, in OJ L 225/16, 12 August 1998.  TRANSNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN WAYS FORWARD FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
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other novelty lies in the clarification that information and consultation 
should take place ‘at the relevant level of management and 
representation, according to the subject under discussion’ (recital 14 and 
15).  
Transnational matters are identified in a more sophisticated way 
than previously. Such are determined by ‘both the scope of its potential 
effects, and the level of management and representation that it involves’ 
(recital 16). The distinction from the merely national enforcement of 
information and consultation rights raises the issue of coordination 
among these two levels. In this, as in other new facets of the revised 
Directive, agreements on the establishment and functioning of the EWCs 
will be crucial in choosing innovative ways forward and in setting the 
preconditions for clear legitimacy tests. A well balanced structure in the 
composition of EWCs will, for example, facilitate the search for real ways 
to seek ‘anticipation and management of changes’ in restructuring. It will 
also clarify a new transnational level of solidarity in parallel with the 
transnational ‘potential effects’ of managerial decisions. EWCs have in 
fact a duty to report back to the employees they represent (recital 33). 
It seems appropriate, therefore, to emphasize the language 
adopted in the revised article 10, where reference is made to a collective 
representation of the employees’ interests, ‘without prejudice to the 
competence of other bodies or organisations’ (art. 10.1). It is also 
specified that EWCs have a duty to inform ‘the representatives of the 
employees of the establishments or of the undertakings’ and, in their 
absence, ‘the workforce as a whole’ (art. 10.2). The importance attached 
to this crucial passage is also confirmed by other detailed provisions, 
such as access to training without any loss of wages, for both members 
of the negotiating body and the EWC, whenever this is deemed 
‘necessary for the exercise of their representative duties in an 
international environment’ (art. 10.4).  
A most relevant innovation, despite its potentially difficult 
enforcement, rests on the idea that EWCs should adapt to ‘significant’ 
changes in the structure of the undertaking or group of undertakings. 
Here again agreements establishing EWCs (art. 6) should intervene with 
strong clauses, guaranteeing links with national representation bodies. 
However, even in the absence of an agreement, existing EWCs must 
continue to operate, seeking to reach a new agreement on the necessary 
adaptations (art.12). 
Empirical research shows that several International Framework 
Agreements have been signed by EWCs, jointly with international and 
national unions. It is worth recalling that this is by now a consolidated 
practice, originating in an unequivocal interest on both sides. 14 SILVANA SCIARRA 
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Furthermore, even when EWCs do not directly sign the agreements 
themselves, leaving the floor to international and national trade unions, 
consensus on the negotiated issues is reached within the EWC. 
37 
In light of the novelties brought about by the revised Directive, it is 
possible to argue that EWCs are legitimate collective actors in both 
promoting transnational agreements and even in signing them. They are 
linked to different representation bodies at other levels; they can be the 
voice of the employees ‘as a whole’ within the boundaries of the 
transnational companies; they are promoters of new solidarities derived 
by transnational collective interests. There is now, more clearly than in 
the past, a solid ground to build up a transnational legitimacy test at a 
purely voluntary level. Detailed solutions are in the hands of the social 
partners.  
3. Protectionism versus Social Dumping 
Recent controversial ECJ rulings were mentioned at the beginning of this 
article with the intent of investigating their impact on national and 
transnational notions of solidarity. After analysing current practices in 
transnational collective bargaining, it was then suggested that solidarities 
in the plural would be a better way to approach the description of 
collective interests lying behind a constantly changing phenomenon of 
standard setting. The Court’s rulings reveal a different and yet parallel 
scenario. 
The Court’s decision in Viking has already been mentioned for its 
immediate impact on European sector social dialogue, leading to a 
proposal for a directive.
38 It is also reassuring that the litigation ended as 
the case was settled in March 2008.
39 However, commentators cannot 
ignore the pressure provoked by Viking within the Finnish legal system, 
shaken by the ECJ’s intrusive intervention on matters relating to the 
autonomy of national collective bargaining. Despite the fact that the right 
t o  s t r i k e  i s  a n  ultima ratio measure in Finland and was, even on that 
occasion, exercised in close correlation with the signature of a collective 
agreement, the Court found it to be in breach of art. 43 TEC.
40 The Court 
                                                 
37 The Ales Report, at fn. 19, quotes all relevant agreements at section 3.2. See also the 
website of the International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF) 
www.imfmetal.org/index.cfm?c=10266&l=2 for further references to recent agreements.  
38 See fn. 33 infra. 
39 N. Bruun, Finland: ECJ and the Challenge of Understanding Collective Bargaining, in R. 
Blanpain, A. M. Światkowski (eds.), The Laval and Viking Cases: Freedom of Services and 
Establishment v. Industrial Conflict in the European Union, Kluwer Law International 2009, 
51. 
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rejected any public policy reasons that would have allowed a restriction 
on freedom of establishment.
41 
The Court questioned whether collective bargaining and the right 
to strike are values underpinning national public policy. For example, in 
addressing issues of proportionality, national judges will have to take into 
account whether collective industrial action is lawful whenever it aims at 
maintaining employment that otherwise would be jeopardised by the 
exercise of market freedoms. This would have been a likely outcome for 
the ferry operator intending to pursue a reflagging of its ferry in 
Estonia.
42 
For the purposes of the present paper, it is useful to underline that 
this judgment confirms the points put forward before, namely the search 
for new solidarities in times of uncertainty. Here solidarities in the plural 
signify that while safeguarding the function of industrial action, the 
eradication of social dumping must be addressed at some level of 
policymaking. Strikes called for the protection of jobs, otherwise 
endangered by a practice of social dumping, should not be deemed illegal 
following the proportionality principle. Nonetheless, a challenging 
proportionality test arises whenever economic freedoms are at stake. 
Viking proves the uneasiness of the ECJ in selecting matters of public 
interest related to the ‘protection’ of workers. The choice of priorities, 
together with ways of addressing solidarities in the plural, should remain 
a prerogative of the collective parties involved in the dispute. 
This plea for self-regulation is in line with the choice made by the 
European social partners signing the agreement – to become a directive 
in due time – addressed to the entire maritime sector.
43 The flexible 
structure of European framework agreements, as the one in question, is 
such to indicate binding principles to be adopted in individual contracts of 
employment, for example in health and safety issues. It also includes 
criteria for the calculation of wages, not the definite setting of salaries, 
                                                 
41 Viking, para. 75. 
42 This could be argued reading the closing para. 90 in Viking. One of the points addressed 
in this case has to do with the enforcement of a peace obligation clause. However, this 
obligation has a ‘relative’ value, since it applies only to matters included in the collective 
agreement. For this clarification, see N. Bruun, Finnish labour law report, in F. 
Dorssemont, T. Jaspers, A. van Hoek (eds.), Cross-border collective actions in Europe, 
Antwerpen, Oxford Intersentia 2007, 105. 
43 A similar controversy in the Irish ferries dispute found a consensual solution in the 
signing of an agreement on 14 December 2005 and the case was not litigated. References 
in T. Novitz, ‘Labour rights as human rights: implications for employers’ free movement in 
an enlarged European Union’, CYELS (2006–2007), vol. 9, 359. 16 SILVANA SCIARRA 
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thus overcoming the problem of wages excluded from TEC’s 
competence.
44 
In  Laval,
45 competitive advantages brought about by social 
dumping may have an even less stable outcome. We cannot enter into 
the detailed implications of this case within the scope of the present 
paper. The points to underline here have to do with the potentially 
disruptive effect of the Court’s ruling on a ‘model’ system of collective 
bargaining.
46 Thus, solutions that should be elaborated in the future may 
become a paradigm illustration, beyond Sweden, on how to regain and 
even enhance the autonomy of national collective bargaining. This should 
be the lesson to learn, if challenges posed by transnational collective 
interests – as in the posting of workers to host countries – become part 
of the agenda of national unions. The alternative would be protectionism, 
a perspective as alien to European traditions as social dumping.
47  
A committee appointed by the Swedish government in April 2008 
delivered a Report in December of that same year.
48 This inquiry, the 
result of detailed consultations with the social partners, the Nordic labour 
law academic community and the Swedish Work Environment Authority, 
is valuable from a comparative perspective. One of the ideas put forward 
by the Report is the comparability of labour standards applied in the 
country of origin by the service provider. The latter should openly 
disclose such information to Swedish trade unions for the purpose of 
comparing them with the hard core provisions in art. 3.1 of Directive 
8 6 / 7 1 .  T h i s  i s  a  f i r s t  s t e p  t o  t a k e  i n  v i e w  o f  e v a l u a t i n g  r e c o u r s e  t o  
industrial action. 
A similar orientation – namely the attempt to avoid controversies 
over issues potentially related to social dumping – inspires the proposal 
to revise the law transposing the Directive on posted workers, in 
consideration of the non enforceability erga omnes of collective 
agreements in the Swedish legal system and in anticipation of what could 
be too ample a reference to binding applicable norms. Infringing art. 49 
                                                 
44 Proposal for a Council Directive, at fn. 33, Standard A2.1, sections 1-4. 
45 Judgment of the Court of 18 December 2007, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan 
and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, C- 341/05. Critical comments by R. Eklund, A Swedish 
perspective on Laval, CLLPJ 2008, 551 ff.  
46 This ‘model’ is now portrayed in R. Eklund, T. Sigeman, L. Carlson, Swedish Labour and 
Employment Law: Cases and Materials, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag 2008. 
47 The alarming case of British workers striking unofficially for ‘British jobs’ at the ‘Lindsey 
Oil’ refinery is discussed by C. Kilpatrick, at fn. 1. 
48 References are to the English summary: C. Stråth, Action in response to the Laval 
judgment, Swedish Government Official Reports, SOU 2008:123, Stockholm 2008.  TRANSNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN WAYS FORWARD FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
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TCE should in such a way be avoided by a preliminary and attentive 
interpretation of public policy issues, as in art. 3.10 of the Directive. 
From a comparative perspective, the three ‘components’ 
suggested in the Report for ascertaining a lawful recourse to industrial 
action are informative. The first component refers to the vexed question 
of levels of bargaining, indicating that the national level should be the 
most relevant. Agreements at this level are binding for all workers in the 
specific sector of economic activities. Furthermore, following a practice – 
familiar to an Italian labour lawyer such as the present author – 
agreements are extended by employers even to workers not associated 
to the signatory unions. The assumption is that erga omnes should be 
interpreted in the light of national mechanisms in extending the coverage 
of collective agreements.  
As for the second component, national collective agreements 
should be the reference point for the Directive’s hard-core provisions. 
However, collective bargaining typically brings about improvements of 
legal standards, for example, paid holidays and rest periods. Even more 
complex is the overall calculation of wages when it comes to including 
special remuneration for overtime, shift work and inconvenient working 
hours including night work. Compensation can also be associated with 
different tasks assigned to workers and thus be at the origin of objective 
differentiations related to experience, competence and responsibility. In 
the absence of minimum wage legislation, the calculation of overall 
salaries, with or without the inclusion of all such detailed elements, must 
be considered a prerogative of the country receiving the services, taking 
into account that in collective bargaining, such choices follow objective 
criteria. 
The third component looks at the country of origin’s standards, 
enforced for workers to be posted. Industrial action will be considered 
unlawful if it is proved that normative standards, not inferior to the ones 
enforceable under Swedish collective agreements, are applicable to 
posted workers in the country of origin. For a foreign observer, some 
ambiguity is entrenched in this third component. When comparisons are 
made with weaker economic systems, one ought to take into 
consideration standards effectively enforced and wage policies de facto 
adopted. Here comparative analysis may reveal profound differences in 
national systems of collective bargaining, also due to highly different 
percentages of union membership. One could speculate that space should 
be left for cross-border negotiations among the social partners, hence for 18 SILVANA SCIARRA 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 73/2009 
solidarities in the plural.
49 It could even be contemplated that objectively 
grounded differentiations in wages, if adopted for limited periods of time, 
could be used as a starting point towards subsequent increases.  
It is useful to stress from a comparative perspective the proposals 
put forward in the Report in the view of enhancing the role of the 
Swedish Work Environment Authority. This body should become a better 
equipped liaison office – as under art. 4 of the Directive – and provide 
detailed and timely disclosure of information to providers wishing to offer 
their services. It should also evaluate the compatibility of a voluntary 
s y s t e m  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g  w i t h i n  E u r o p e a n  l a w ,  i n  a  p r i o r  
examination of the collective agreements that the social partners intend 
to enforce for posted workers. 
The Report is also attentive to the issue of employers not 
members of the associations that are signatories to the collective 
agreements. This typical facet of a purely voluntary system of collective 
bargaining is addressed, suggesting that standard agreements in different 
economic sectors should be made available and become applicable to 
posted workers, provided that the above mentioned Authority finds them 
compatible with the Directive 96/71.  
Examples of the active roles played by national legislatures in the 
aftermath of the Court’s rulings reveal an interesting, developing trend. 
In Denmark, a government appointed committee suggested changes to 
the national legislation implementing the Posted Workers Directive, with 
an eye to preserving the main characteristics of the Danish voluntary 
system of collective bargaining. The new law came into force on January 
1
st 2009. 
50 Industrial action is lawfully exercised against foreign service 
providers if aimed at achieving salaries equivalent to those of Danish 
workers, for jobs with equal professional contents. 
The Danish Committee, following Laval, also suggested that 
transparent information should be released, because of the non 
enforceability erga omnes of Danish collective agreements. In compliance 
with art. 3.8 of the Directive, Danish law now requires that lawful 
recourse to strikes implies that reference should be made to wages 
                                                 
49 Cooperation agreements aimed at preventing social dumping were reached among Baltic 
trade unions and neighbouring Nordic countries, especially in the construction industry. See 
EIRR, August 2006, 3. Suggestions on establishing transnational collective bargaining 
having minimum wage as a mandatory subject within cross border provisions of service in 
A. Lo Faro, Is a decent wage part of a decent job? Answers from an enlarged Europe, WP 
C.S.D.L.E Massimo D’Antona, INT 64/2008. 
50 The Danish Commission appointed by government published its report in June 2008. 
References in R. Nielsen, Denmark: The Viking Line and Laval Cases Seen from a Danish 
Perspective, in R. Blanpain, A.M. Światkowski (eds.), at fn. 39. TRANSNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN WAYS FORWARD FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
19 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 73/2009 
determined in collective agreements signed by most representative 
unions and employers associations.  
In Germany, following the ECJ’s decision in Rüffert,
51 the 
legislature in Lower Saxony redrafted the provisions on the award of 
public contracts in the building sector. Contractors must specify in writing 
their intention to enter collective agreements that are enforceable locally, 
as soon as they open the procedure for subcontracting and further on 
when the contract enters into force. These new formalities will prove full 
compliance with art. 3.8 of Directive 96/71, which refers to erga omnes 
collective agreements. The change in legislation implies that the 
procedure for extending the coverage of collective agreements, first an 
option for the parties signatories to them, is now compulsory, for the 
sake of avoiding infringement of European law. 
52     
All these very different examples prove that protectionist reactions 
do not provide the right answers to new and potentially conflicting 
solidarities. They also prove that the spreading of social dumping can 
only be stopped by joint initiatives of the social partners.  
It is asserted that foreign investments tailored to an exploitation of 
low wages do not create employment, based as they often are on very 
high levels of productivity. Furthermore, the need for rapid technological 
innovations may favour the off-shoring of services and employment 
outside of the EU. These are all good reasons to believe that forward 
looking initiatives in the service sector as well as in manufacturing will 
need to enhance training and fair wages, rather than adopt social 
dumping.
53 ILO research confirms that unbalanced results occur when the 
search for lower wages is the main outcome expected in business 
mobility.
54 The global phenomena of outsourcing can only be efficiently 
counterbalanced by new innovative principles of ‘market governance’.
55  
4.Concluding Remarks. New Developments for 
Transnational Collective Bargaining 
                                                 
51 Judgment of the Court of 3 April 2008, Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen, C- 346/06. 
52 Art. 3, law of the Land of Lower Saxony, 15 December 2008. I am grateful to Prof. M. 
Fuchs for this information. References to the extension of collective agreements in M. Fuchs, 
National Report on Germany, in S. Sciarra (ed.), The evolving structure of collective 
bargaining in Europe, http://eprints.unifi.it/archive/00001160.  
53 Interesting indications on the EU as the largest importer and exporter of services, even 
after enlargement, in G. Kemekliene, H. Conolly, M.Keune, A. Watt, Services employment in 
Europe, ETUI-REHS 2007, 42 ff. 
54 A fair globalization: creating opportunities for all, Report of the World commission on the 
social dimension of globalization, ILO, Geneva 2004. 
55 G. Gereffi, The new offshoring of jobs and global development, ILO Social policy lectures, 
ILO, Geneva 2006, 41 ff. 20 SILVANA SCIARRA 
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An objective of this paper was to initiate a discussion regarding the 
assumption that ‘transnationality’ is taking shape both as a concept and 
as a practice. Based essentially in customary law – as we ought to 
consider recent developments of European social dialogue and the 
practice of international cross-border dialogue – it is not extraneous to 
secondary European legislation.
56  
Voluntary transnational texts are developing on a de facto basis, proving 
once more the autonomy of collective bargaining.
57 Rather than reducing 
state’s sovereignty, transnational collective bargaining adds to the 
capacities of the state as regulator. The designation of new bargaining 
agents and the setting up of competences within trade unions and 
employer associations are all signs of collective autonomy. Nevertheless, 
the definition of new collective interests, shaped around solidarities in the 
plural, can force national legislatures into new frames of reference, for 
example into the direction of auxiliary legislation, in support of 
transnational collective autonomy. National legislatures, along with social 
partners, will learn that nothing but false promises can be generated by 
recourse to social dumping and by consequent protectionist answers. 
Examples taken from the practice of transnational collective 
bargaining, both inside and outside the EU, show that a new transnational 
collective autonomy is slowly emerging and adapting to specific 
requirements of the negotiators. This is happening despite the weakness 
of collective social rights, such as rights to information and consultation. 
The hope is that other collective rights will not be weakened as a result of 
the previously mentioned case law. The idea put forward in this paper is 
that a positive and inventive reactio n  t o  r e c e n t  E C J ’ s  r u l i n g s  c o u l d  
paradoxically enhance new synergies among the social partners. 
The impetus to look to the future in this discussion comes from the 
present economic and financial crisis. Issues of social justice are more 
u r g e n t  t h a n  e v e r  a n d  s o  i s  t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  i n n o v a t i v e  w a y s  t o  a d d r e s s  
solidarities in the plural. Transnational collective bargaining opens the 
ground to the enforceability of standards, whenever comparable working 
conditions apply.  
                                                 
56 See, for example, the Posted Workers Directive 96/71/EC of 16 December 1996, in OJ L 
18, 21 January 1997, recital 6, talking of ‘transnationalization’ of the employment 
relationship; see also the references to the revised EWC Directive at section 2.3 above. 
Agency work offers interesting insights. See K. Ahlberg, B. Bercusson, N. Bruun, H 
Kountouros, C. Vigneau, L. Zappalà, Transnational Labour Regulation A case study of 
temporary Agency Work, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang 2008. 
57 The concept of autonomy from a comparative perspective is analysed in S. Sciarra, The 
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An emphasis has been placed above on the legitimacy of the 
bargaining agents whenever transnational issues are at stake. Each time 
selective solidarity is the underlying principle in negotiations, specific 
mandates should be required for the negotiators. On the employer’s side, 
it could be ascertained that a mandate relating to strategies of selective 
solidarity be issued by the controlling company. On the workers’ side, one 
ought to look at constituencies within the companies, taking into account 
areas of the productive processes concretely affected by transnational 
strategies. Similar working conditions generate the notion of collective 
interest. The latter is, by all means, the starting point in transnational 
collective bargaining. 
Restructuring and the EGAF pose the question of objective criteria 
to be adopted when jobs are lost and help is required. Access to 
European funds could be pivotal in new emerging dimensions of 
transnational interests.
58 Employment policies on flexicurity, eligible, 
according to recent guidelines of the European Council, give support to 
the ESF. To take one of many examples, it could be maintained that a 
transnational collective interest to training, parallel to the request of new 
and differentiated skills, is inherent in most cases of restructuring.  
This very broad discussion is also relevant in addressing once 
more problems of shared competences between the EU and Member 
States. The suggestion is that new approaches to ‘variable geometry’ 
should be pursued. Social partners and national legislators should be 
looking favourably towards a European framework in which all existing 
initiatives based on transnational collective bargaining should evolve, 
setting aside fears of reciprocal interferences. Meanwhile, all actors, both 
public and private, cannot but acknowledge that transnationality is part of 
European law in action. 
                                                 
58 In Responding to the crisis, at fn. 17, p. 8 the Commission favours recourse to 
instruments to ‘support the social cost of adjustment and to ensure that necessary skill 
levels required for the future competitiveness of industry are retained in the industry’ for all 
sectors. 